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1. Introduction 
In 2010, the State Intellectual Property Office of China (hereafter “SIPO”) received 1,222,286 
patent applications, which represents a 25-per cent annual increase from the number of 
applications in 2009. According to a Thomson Reuters’ report, if China’s patent applications 
figures continue to grow at this pace, China will rank first among all countries in patent 
applications received and will also grant the most patents in the world in 2011 (Zhou and 
Stembridge, 2010). However, some government officials and legal experts have expressed 
concerns about the low value (quality) of Chinese patents, despite the rapid increase in volume. 
They argue that patent application figures in China have been inflated by a government subsidy 
that covers patent application costs and various benefits associated with patent applications, 
including the opportunity for inventors to receive cash bonuses from either employers or local 
governments. Moreover, graduates who apply for patents are more likely to earn residency 
permits (Hukou) to live in a desirable city, and professors are more likely to be promoted if they 
hold patents (Economists, 2010). Despite these concerns, however, to the best of our knowledge 
no one has conducted a systematic, rigorous study of the value (quality) of Chinese patents. The 
extant evidence is largely anecdotal or is based on simple statistics. 
 
The value of Chinese patents can be evaluated based on patent renewal information. When a 
patent is due for renewal annually, its holder must pay an annual renewal fee to maintain its 
validity. The patent holder determines whether holding a patent has a value that exceeds the 
value of the renewal fee. If the benefit is greater than the fee, the patent holder renews the patent. 
If not, she lets the patent lapse before the end of its full protection term. Patents that are renewed 
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for longer periods should thus confer greater economic value to holders than would those that are 
renewed for shorter periods. Statistics have shown that, among patents granted by SIPO, patents 
originating in foreign countries are held comparatively longer than were those held by domestic 
entities. Among domestic invention patents, 46.7 per cent were renewed beyond five years while 
only 4.6 per cent were renewed beyond ten years. In contrast, 83.5 per cent of foreign-held 
patents were renewed beyond five years and 23.8 per cent were renewed beyond ten years (SIPO, 
2011). The value of patents owned by foreign applicants should, accordingly, be higher than is 
that of patents owned by domestic applicants. In addition, short-lived patents, such as the 46.7 
per cent of patents applied for by domestic entities that are renewed for less than five years, 
should have very low value.  
 
In this study, we go beyond simple statistics to undertake a comprehensive study of renewal 
information pertaining to Chinese invention patents that were applied for in 1987–1989 and 
utility model patents that were applied for in 1986–1998, and we estimate their value. We 
evaluate and compare the value of patents over a range of cohorts, patents applied for by various 
applicant types—such as domestic and foreign individuals, universities and research institutions, 
companies—patents falling into various technology fields, and patents originating in various 
provinces of China. The value is evaluated using a nonlinear least square model for estimation 
purposes. The unit of analysis is group of patents aggregated based on patent cohort, type of 
applicant, technology field, and province. As the value of a patent can be considered as a return 
on the investment involved in holding intellectual property rights, we are interested in evaluating 
the value obtained by holding granted patent rights as compensation for R&D investment. We 
estimate the total value of invention and utility model patents that were applied for in 1987 and 
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compare this figure with the total value of China’s R&D investment in the corresponding period. 
Based on this evaluation, we reveal the significance of the patent system for R&D activities and 
investment in China. In addition, to examine the value of invention patents applied for in a 
relatively recent period, we analyse renewal information on invention patents applied for in 
2002–2003 and compare that information with data on patents applied for in the 1987–1989 
cohorts. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the estimation methodology 
and the model we use to estimate the value of patent rights. Section 3 describes the data on 
Chinese patents. Section 4 presents the estimation results. Section 5 calculates the value of the 
patent rights that the patent system creates as a subsidy for R&D expenditure in China. Section 6 
conjectures about the value of invention patents applied for in the more recent period of 2002–
2003. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Methodology and model 
Arora et al. (2010) identify three main approaches to estimating patent value: the market value 
approach, the patent renewal approach, and the inventor survey approach. The market value 
approach, adopted in such studies as Griliches (1981) and Hall et al. (2005), uses stock market 
value to estimate the value of firms’ tangible and intangible capital stock (which includes patent 
stocks) and infers the value of patents from these data. The patent renewal approach analyses 
patent renewal records and the costs of patenting and renewing to assess the distribution of 
earnings from patents (the value of patents). The inventor survey approach, exemplified by Giuri 
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et al. (2007) and Gambardella et al. (2008), represents a subjective evaluation made by inventors 
on the value of their inventions. Given the patent renewal information that we found available for 
Chinese patents, we use the patent renewal approach in this study to estimate the value of 
Chinese patents.  
 
2.1 The basic patent renewal model 
 
After the first patent renewal study was published by Schankerman and Pakes in 1986, a variety 
of models have been developed by scholars to estimate the value of patent rights. The group of 
models studied by Schankerman and Pakes (1986), Pakes (1986), Pakes and Simpson (1989), 
Lanjouw (1998), Schankerman (1998), Baudry and Dumont (2006) and Bessen (2008) model 
renewal decisions only. By contrast, Putnam (1996) and Deng (2007) model application and 
renewal decisions together. All these models differ also in the way in which constraints on patent 
renewal decisions are specified. Among these studies, Pakes (1986), Pakes and Simpson (1989), 
Lanjouw (1998), and Baudry and Dumont (2006) do not assume that returns on patent rights 
decay deterministically, while the other studies do. By avoiding this assumption, these three 
studies allow for stochastic returns, uncertainty, and learning in renewal decisions. In their 
models, patent value is divided into the value of current-year returns on patent protection and the 
value of the option of renewing in the next year. Even if the value of current-year returns on a 
given patent is lower than the value of renewal fees, as long as the value of the renewal option 
that is exercised in the next year is large enough for patentees to recover their losses, they will 
still renew the patent. When applying the models studied by Schankerman and Pakes (1986), 
Schankerman (1988), and Bessen (2008), which specify a deterministic decay rate, the patentee 
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will not renew. Pakes (1986), Pakes and Simpson (1989), and Lanjouw (1998) also use dynamic 
programming to estimate the length of time required to ascertain patent value. They find that the 
learning process is actually not very long. In a period of approximately five or six years, most 
patentees discover the value of their patent rights. Baudry and Dumont (2006) use a method 
similar to that of Pakes (1986), but they employ a more generalized stochastic process (a 
binomial tree) that is standard in the finance literature to evaluate the value of the option of 
renewing a patent in the next year. 
 
The patent renewal model that allows for stochastic returns is considerably more complex than 
the model assuming deterministic returns is. However, the advantage of using the former model 
over the latter is that the former enhances the extent to which the estimated renewed proportion 
of patents is approximately equal to the real renewed proportion (Pakes, 1986, p.774). Weighing 
the trade-off between the complexity of the stochastic model and the gain in accuracy, we in this 
paper use the basic patent renewal model outlined in Schankerman and Pakes (1986) to estimate 
the value of Chinese patents. This model is built to solve a patent owner’s decision problem, 
namely that of maximizing the discounted returns on a patent minus the cost of the patenting 
itself as  
 
(1) max்אሾଵ,ଶ,…, ത்ሿ ܸሺܶሻ ൌ ∑ ൫ܴ௧௝ െ ܥ௧௝൯ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻି௧௧்ୀଵ , 
 
where ܴ௧௝   represents returns on patent protection,  ܥ௧௝ is the renewal fee, t is the age of the patent, 
j is its cohort, i is the assumed discount rate of.10 and  തܶ is the statutory limit on patent 
protection. Assuming that൫ܴ௧௝ െ ܥ௧௝൯ is n  is non-increasing (ܴ௧௝ decreases deterministically and 
7 
 
ܥ௧௝ i  increases or is unchanged as the age of the patent increases1), as long as the value of annual 
returns at age t is equal to or greater than the renewal fee, which is 
 
(2) ܴ௧௝ ൒ ܥ௧௝, 
 
we can see that the patent owner would choose to renew the patent in order to maximize  ܸሺܶሻ. 
The owner stops renewing the patent at the first age that ܴ௧௝ െ ܥ௧௝ ൏ 0. This age is called the 
optimal lifespan ܶכ. If no such ܶכ א ሾ1,2, …,, തܶሿ,  then ܶכ ൌ തܶ. Assuming that the value of the 
patent decays deterministically over time, we then have  
 
(3) ܴ௧௝ ൌ ܴ଴௝ ∏ ሺ1 െ ߜఛ௝ሻ௧ఛୀଵ , 
 
where ܴ଴௝ represents initial returns and ߜఛ௝ is the decay rate of those returns. Schankerman and 
Pakes (1986) and Lanjouw (1998) assume  ln൫ܴ଴௝ ൯ ~ ܰሺߤ௝, ߪ௝ଶሻ  and conclude that a lognormal 
distribution of the initial returns ܴ଴௝ vis-à-vis the Weibull and Pareto distributions provides the 
closest fit of the data. Following Equations (2) and (3), patent holders renew a patent at age t if 
and only if ln ሺܴ଴௝ ሻ ൒ ݈݊ܥ௧௝ െ ∑ ݈݊ሺ1 െ ߜఛ௝ሻ௧ఛୀଵ , or equivalently,  
 
(4) ୪୬ ሺோబೕ ሻିఓೕ ఙೕ ൒
௟௡஼೟ೕିఓೕି∑ ௟௡ሺଵିఋഓೕሻ೟ഓసభ
ఙೕ . 
 
Because ୪୬ ሺோబೕ ሻିఓೕ ఙೕ  has a standardized normal distribution, the proportion of patents in cohort j 
that are not renewed at age t is given by  
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(5) 1 െ ௧ܲ௝ ൌ Φ ൬௟௡஼೟ೕିఓೕି∑ ௟௡ሺଵିఋഓೕሻ
೟ഓసభ
ఙೕ ൰, 
 
where ௧ܲ௝ is the proportion of patents in cohort j that are renewed at age t and  Φሺ. ሻ is the 
standardized normal distribution function. The estimation problem based on Equation (5) is to 
choose ߤ௝ (ܴ଴௝ሻ, ߪ௝  and ߜఛ௝, which make the predicted renewal proportions at each age t and 
cohort j as close to the observed proportions as possible. An estimation function based on 
Equation (5) can be written as 
 
(6) ݕఛ௝ ؠ Φିଵ൫1 െ ௧ܲ௝൯ ൌ ௟௡஼೟ೕିఓೕି∑ ௟௡ሺଵିఋഓೕሻ
೟ഓసభ
ఙೕ ൅ ߝఛ௝,  
 
where ߝఛ௝ has a mean of zero and variance of ߪఌଶ. Equation (6) can be estimated by the nonlinear 
least square method. The estimated values of ߤ௝ (ܴ଴௝ሻ, ߪ௝  and ߜఛ௝ are used to simulate the value 
of a single patent based on  
 
(7)  ܸሺܶሻ ൌ ∑ ሾܴ଴௝ ∏ ሺ1 െ ߜఛ௝ሻ௧ఛୀଵ െ ܥ௧௝ሿሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻି௧்כ௧ୀଵ . 
 
We draw 50,000 variables from a lognormal distribution with the estimated value of ߤఫෝ ,  σ఩ෝ  and 
ߜఫ෡ , calculate V for each of them, and then derive the quantiles of the implied distribution of V. 
The process is repeated three more times, each time perturbing one of the estimated parameters 
(ߤఫෝ ,  σ఩ෝ  or ߜఫ෡ ) by one per cent. Through this process, we obtain the numerical estimates of the 
derivatives of each of the quantiles with respect to the parameters. Together with the variance-
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covariance matrix of the parameter estimates, we can calculate the standard errors of each of the 
quantiles through the delta method (Equation 8).   
(8) Var( ௤ܸ௨௔௡௧௜௟௘௦ሻ ൌ
ቂడ௏೜ೠೌ೙೟೔೗೐ೞడఓണෞ  
డ௏೜ೠೌ೙೟೔೗೐ೞ
డσഡෝ  
డ௏೜ೠೌ೙೟೔೗೐ೞ
డఋണ෢ ቃ ൦
ݒܽݎሺߤఫෝ ሻ ܿ݋ݒሺߤఫෝ , σ఩ෝ  ሻ ܿ݋ݒሺߤఫෝ , ߜఫ෡ ሻ
ܿ݋ݒሺσ఩ෝ , ߤఫෝ ሻ ݒܽݎሺσ఩ෝ  ሻ ܿ݋ݒሺσ఩ෝ , ߜఫ෡ ሻ
ܿ݋ݒሺߜఫ෡ , ߤఫෝ ሻ ܿ݋ݒሺߜఫ෡ , σ఩ෝ ሻ ݒܽݎሺߜఫ෡ ሻ
൪
ۏ
ێێ
ێێ
ۍడ௏೜ೠೌ೙೟೔೗೐ೞడఓണෞ
డ௏೜ೠೌ೙೟೔೗೐ೞ
డσഡෝ  
డ௏೜ೠೌ೙೟೔೗೐ೞ
డఋണ෢ ے
ۑۑ
ۑۑ
ې
 
 
3. Data 
       3.1 Data source 
The renewal records and other patent information are collected from the China Patent Abstract 
Database. The database includes over four million patent applications submitted by domestic and 
foreign applicants to the Chinese Intellectual Property Office during 1985–2009. The 
information provided in the database on each patent includes patent application and publication 
number, application and publication date, patent number, title, International Patent Classification 
(IPC) class, abstract, claims, renewal records, and so on. 
 
There are three types of patents in the Chinese patent system: invention, utility model, and 
design.2 Invention patent applications are subject to substantive examination. Patent examiners 
are required to conduct a search of prior art before granting invention patents. Utility model 
patents are granted on a registration basis and need not undergo a substantive examination 
process, which usually represents incremental technological improvements. Currently invention 
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patents are protected for 20 years, while utility model and design patents are protected for only 
ten years. 
 
China’s patent law was promulgated in 1985 and amended in 1992, 2000, and 2008. SIPO first 
received patent applications in 1985. The 1985 version of the patent law stipulates that invention 
patents be protected for 15 years while utility model and design patents be protected for five 
years, but the protection of utility model and design patents can be extended to eight years. The 
1992 amendment extends the protection period for invention patents (covering those applied for 
after December 31st, 1992) to 20 years and for utility model and design patents (covering those 
applied for after December 31st, 1992) to ten years. To harmonize China’s intellectual property 
rights standards with international rules, as China anticipated signing, in 2001, the Agreement of 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights as part of its World Trade Organization 
obligations, SIPO extended the protection period for invention patents that were applied for 
before December 31st, 1992 and were still valid until December 11th, 2001 to 20 years. Being 
protected for only for 15 years under the 1985 version of the patent law, invention patents that 
were applied for before December 11th, 1986 would have expired before December 11th, 2001. 
Therefore, this decision virtually extended the protection period for all invention patents applied 
for after December 11th, 1986 to 20 years. 
 
We designate a cohort of patents as all the patents applied for in a given year. The China Patent 
Abstract Database provides full information on the lifespan of invention patents in the 1985–
1989 cohorts and of utility model patents in the 1985–2000 cohorts. Therefore, the latest cohort 
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of invention patents that we can include in the analysis is 1989. Obviously, the value of invention 
patents with full protection terms of 20 years would be higher than the value of patents with full 
protections terms of 15 years would be. Similarly, the value of utility model patents with full 
protection terms of ten years would be higher than that of patents with full protection terms of 
eight years would be. We thus focus on invention patents that are covered by the full protection 
term of 20 years, that is, those that were applied for after December 11th, 1986, namely those that 
were applied for in 1987, 1988, and 1989. We integrate the 285 patents applied for between 
December 11th, 1986 (inclusive) and December 31st, 1986 (inclusive) into the 4347 patents 
applied for in 1987. The numbers of granted patents from the 1987, 1988, and 1989 cohorts are 
thus 4632, 4835, and 4337, respectively. We examine the renewal records for utility model 
patents that have maximal lifespans of ten years, that is, patents on the 1986–1998 cohorts.3  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
  
We define the renewal proportion as the proportion of patents in cohort j that are renewed at age 
t. Conversely, the dropout proportion is defined as the proportion of patents in cohort j that are 
not renewed at age t. Figure 1 shows that the renewal proportion of invention patents starts to 
decline after age three while that of utility model patents begins to decline after age two. Only 
about 16–17 per cent of invention patents were renewed to full term. Less than ten per cent of 
utility model patents were renewed until age ten. For the invention and utility model patents that 
were not renewed to full term, the dropout proportion peaked at age eight and age five, 
respectively (Figure 2). 
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(Here insert Figure 1) 
(Here insert Figure 2) 
 
The nominal renewal fees for Chinese patents are obtained through various Announcements of 
SIPO (No. 4, No. 33, No. 36, No. 43, and No.75). The nominal renewal fees are converted to real 
costs using the implicit GDP deflator provided by the World Bank. The age paths of the nominal 
and deflated renewal fees are demonstrated in Figure 3, which indicates that the average deflated 
renewal fee for invention patents increases until age 16 and declines afterwards. This result 
differs from those associated with the fee schedule examined by Schankerman and Pakes (1986), 
in which the renewal fee monotonically increases along the patent lifecycle until age 20 in 
Germany, the UK, and France. However, because we assume that  ൫ܴ௧௝ െ ܥ௧௝൯ is non-increasing 
even though ܥ௧௝ decreases after age 16, the basic model established by Schankerman and Pakes 
(1986) is still valid for the Chinese data. Differing from the fee schedule for invention patents, 
the renewal fee for utility model patents increases monotonically. 
(Here insert Figure 3) 
 
We obtain information along three dimensions for each patent directly from the Database: cohort, 
technology field, and location of patent origin. We clean the patent records to produce 
information along an additional dimension: applicant type. Summary statistics on granted 
invention patents show that three per cent, 45 per cent, and 71 per cent of such patents were not 
renewed at ages five, ten, and 15. Only 17 per cent of patents were renewed to full term (Table 1). 
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There is no material difference across the three cohorts in terms of dropout rate and the share of 
patents renewed to full term. However, a significant difference exists between patents applied for 
by domestic entities and those applied for by foreign entities. Less than five per cent of patents 
applied for by domestic entities were renewed to full term. More than 90 per cent of such patents 
were not renewed at age 15. Among patents applied for by domestic entities, those applied for by 
universities and research institutions lapsed soonest. In contrast, from 14 per cent to 25 per cent 
of patents applied for by foreign entities were renewed to full term. Patents applied for by 
foreign corporations enjoy the longest lives, as 58 per cent were renewed at age 15 and 25 per 
cent were renewed to full term. Among patents belonging to eight technology fields, patents in 
fixed construction exhibited the shortest lives. Only nine per cent of patents in this category were 
renewed to full term. By comparison, 14 per cent to 21 per cent of patents in the other seven 
fields were renewed to full term. The lives of patents originating in China were shorter than were 
those of patents originating in foreign countries.4 Twenty-four per cent of patents originating in 
foreign countries were renewed to full term. However, only three per cent of patents originating 
in China were renewed to full term.  
(Here insert Table 1) 
 
Summary statistics on granted utility model patents show that, on average, 61 per cent were not 
renewed at age five. Only six per cent of such patents were renewed to full term (Table 2). 
Dropout rates at age five across the 13 cohorts vary from 47 to 73 per cent and shares of patents 
renewed to full term vary from two to 12 per cent. However, the dropout rate at age five declined 
gradually after the mid-1990s and the share of patents renewed to full term increased in the same 
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period, which shows that patent holders began gradually to renew utility model patents for a 
longer period following the mid-1990s.  
 
As was true in the case of invention patents, a significant difference exists between utility model 
patents applied for by domestic entities and those applied for by foreign entities. First, foreign 
entities applied for much fewer utility model patents than domestic entities did. Of 349,703 
utility model patents, only 30,706 (8.7 per cent) originated abroad.  Sixty-seven per cent of 
utility model patents were applied for by domestic individuals alone. Second, foreign applicants 
renewed a higher proportion of patents to full term than domestic entities did. Only about three, 
seven, and 12 per cent of patents applied for by domestic individuals, universities and research 
institutions, and corporations, respectively, were renewed to full term. In contrast, 14 per cent, 37 
per cent, and 37 per cent of patents applied for by foreign individuals, universities and research 
institutions, and corporations, respectively, were renewed to full term. Among patents in eight 
technology fields, those for human necessities had the shortest lives, as only four per cent of 
patents in this category were renewed to full term. In comparison, ten per cent of patents in 
chemistry and metallurgy were renewed to full term. As was true in the case of invention patents, 
utility model patents originating in China had shorter lives than did patents originating in foreign 
countries. Nineteen per cent of patents originating in foreign countries were renewed to full term. 
However, only three to six per cent of patents originating in the three Chinese regions were 
renewed to full term.  
(Here insert Table 2) 
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4. Empirical analyses and results 
We estimate Equation (6) by incorporating information pertaining to our four dimensions—
cohort, applicant type, technology field, and nationality and region—separately in the regressions 
(see Table 3 and Table 4).  The first column of Table 3 shows the results for the no-effects model, 
which is run with no variation in μ. Two dummy variables representing patents in the 1988 and 
1989 cohorts are added to the fixed-effects model in the second column. The reference group is 
the 1987 cohort. Therefore, μ represents the initial returns on the 1987 cohort. Five dummy 
variables for applicant type and seven dummy variables for technology field are included in the 
regression (see column 3 and 4). In these regressions, μ represents the initial returns of the 
reference groups “domestic universities and research institutions” and “textile; paper,” 
respectively. As seen in Table 4, 30 dummy variables that represent the 30 provinces and three 
dummy variables that represent the eastern, central, and western regions are also included in the 
model. The reference group for these two groups of dummies is comprised of patents originating 
in foreign countries.  
(Here insert Table 3) 
(Here insert Table 4) 
 
The Wald test statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of Cohort1988 equals that of 
Cohort1989 is F (1, 1921) = 2.3, which is not statistically significant at the 0.1 level. This result 
indicates that the differences in initial returns on invention patents from the 1987, 1988, and 
1989 cohorts are not statistically significant. Consistent with the summary statistics, patents 
applied for by foreign entities have higher value than do patents applied for by domestic entities. 
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Invention patents applied for by foreign corporations have the highest value, and those applied 
for by domestic universities and institutions (the reference group) have the lowest value. The 
value of invention patents applied for by foreign individuals, foreign universities and research 
institutions, domestic individuals, and domestic corporations are intermediate and ranked in 
descending order. Patents belonging to the technology fields human necessities, chemistry and 
metallurgy, and electricity have higher value than do patents in textile and paper, performing 
operations and transportation, fixed construction, mechanical engineering, lighting, heating, 
weapons and blasting, and physics. The Wald test shows that the values of patents belonging to 
the latter technology fields do not differ significantly from each other.  The results of the fixed-
effects model with respect to location in Table 4 demonstrate that patents originating in 
economically developed provinces in China’s eastern and coastal region are more valuable than 
are those from the economically underdeveloped provinces in the central and western regions. 
The Wald test proves that the difference between the coefficients of the three regions is 
statistically significant. However, patents of foreign origin are invariably more valuable than are 
those from any of the three Chinese regions.  
 
Using the estimated results of column 3 in Table 3 and Equations (7) and (8), we are able to 
delineate the distribution of the value of the invention patents that were applied for by various 
types of applicants. Our model cannot estimate accurately the value of patents renewed to full 
term, as the value of these patents is affected by the fat tail of the lognormal distribution. 
Therefore, the estimated median value of invention patents is more accurate than the estimated 
mean value is because the latter reflects the estimated value of patents renewed to full term. As 
seen in Table 5, all medians (50th per centile) are greater than their standard deviations are. In 
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contrast, half of the means are smaller than their standard deviations are. The 90th per centiles are 
also estimated less precisely than the 25th, 50th, and 75th per centiles are. The medians of 
invention patents applied for by foreign corporations, foreign individuals, foreign universities 
and research institutions, domestic individuals, domestic corporations, and domestic universities 
and research institutions are (at constant 2008 prices) RMB 1,072,829, RMB 616,443, RMB 
354,164, RMB 86,392, RMB 59,157 and RMB 41,434, respectively.5 Consistent with the 
findings on the summary statistics, the median value of invention patents applied for by foreign 
corporations is 18 times higher than the value of patents applied for by domestic corporations is. 
The median value of patents applied for by foreign individuals and foreign universities and 
research institutions also is significantly higher than is the value of patents applied for by their 
Chinese counterparts. 
(Here insert Table 5) 
 
The estimation of the value of utility model patents is provided in Tables 6 and 7. The μ figure in 
Column 2 in Table 6 represents the initial returns on the 1986 cohort, the reference group in the 
regression. The value of patents increases gradually after 1993 and value of the 1993–1998 
cohorts is statistically significantly higher than is the value of the 1986–1992 cohorts. It seems 
that the 1992 amendment to the Patent Law, which prolongs the protection period for utility 
model patents from eight years to ten years, boosts the value of patent rights. The amendment 
went into effect on January 1st, 1993. Patents applied for during and after 1986 could be still 
valid in 1993 (at age eight) and could possibly be renewed to full term. Although holders of these 
patents can, in theory, renew their patents for up to ten years, many of them probably choose to 
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let their patents lapse before they reach age eight. We argue that that is the reason that patents 
applied for after 1993 are renewed for longer periods than are patents applied for before 1993; 
accordingly, patents in the 1993–1998 cohorts have higher value.  
(Here insert Table 6) 
(Here insert Table 7) 
 
As seen in Column 3, Table 6, utility model patents applied for by foreign corporations and 
universities and research institutions have the highest value, and those applied for by domestic 
individuals (although they are the largest in number) have the lowest value. The value of utility 
model patents applied for by foreign individuals, domestic corporations, and domestic 
universities and research institutions is intermediate and ranked in descending order. Patents 
belonging to the technology fields performing operations and transportation, mechanical 
engineering, lighting, heating, weapons and blasting, physics, and electricity have higher value 
than do those falling into human necessities, chemistry and metallurgy, fixed construction, and 
textile and paper (the reference group). In addition, the Wald test shows that the value of patents 
in human necessities is lower than is that of patents in chemistry and metallurgy and fixed 
construction, but the value of patents in the latter two fields does not differ significantly. As is 
true in the case of invention patents, utility model patents originating in economically developed 
provinces in China’s eastern and coastal region are more valuable than are those from the 
economically underdeveloped provinces in the central and western regions. The Wald test proves 
that the differences among the coefficients on the three regions are statistically significant. 
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We present the distribution of the value of utility model patents that are applied for by various 
types of applicants in Table 8. As is true in the case of the value of invention patents, the 90th per 
centile and means are estimated with less precision than are the 25th and 50th per centiles. The 
medians (50th per centile) of utility model patents applied for by foreign corporations, foreign 
universities and research institutions, foreign individuals, domestic corporations, domestic 
universities and research institutions, and domestic individuals are (at constant 2008 prices) 
RMB 541,284, RMB 513,162, RMB 218,644, RMB 88,070, RMB 69,284, and RMB 38,564, 
respectively.6 Utility model patents applied for by domestic individuals are greatest in number 
but least in value. The median value of invention patents applied for by foreign corporations, 
universities and research institutions, and foreign individuals is significantly higher than is that 
of patents applied for by their counterparts based in China.  
(Here insert Table 8) 
 
Comparing the median value of invention and utility model patents, we find that invention 
patents applied for by foreign corporations are twice as valuable as are utility model patents 
applied for by such corporations. Invention patents applied for by foreign individuals are three 
times as valuable as utility model patents applied for by such individuals are. Invention patents 
can be renewed for 20 years but utility model patents can be renewed for only ten years; it seems 
only natural that the value of the former would be higher than that of the latter would be. 
However, this is not always the case. Utility model patents applied for by domestic universities 
and research institutions, domestic corporations, and foreign universities and research institutions 
are more valuable, respectively, than are invention patents applied for by the same applicant 
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types. Although invention patents can be protected longer than utility model patents can be, 
apparently most of the above three types of applicants have not chosen to do so. Instead, they 
maintain invention patents for shorter periods than they do with utility model patents, which 
lowers the value of the former in comparison with that of the latter. 
 
Our finding that foreign corporations are able to realize greater value from their patents than 
applicants of the other five types are is consistent with Bessen’s (2008) study of US patent 
renewal records. He found that, regarding renewal records for 1991 cohort US patents, those 
owned by individuals, small companies, and non-profit organizations have much lower value 
than do those owned by large companies. Foreign companies that patented in China in 1987 are, 
arguably, large multinational companies. They simply had greater resources than did their 
counterparts in universities or research institutions, foreign individuals, or domestic applicants 
with which to renew patents for a longer period and realize greater value out of those patents. 
 
5. Value of patents as an equivalent subsidy for R&D 
The value of patents is determined by the returns that patent applicants can appropriate by 
investing in R&D and subsequently applying for patents on the results. Patent value can be also 
understood as a subsidy that the patent system provides for patent applicants’ R&D investments. 
In this section, we estimate the scale of this subsidy by calculating the ratio of the total value of 
patent rights to R&D expenditure spent to produce those patents, which is termed by 
Schankerman (1998) the “equivalent subsidy rate.”  The total value of patent rights is computed 
by multiplying the estimated mean value in Table 5 and Table 8 by the number of patents in the 
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1987 cohort in each category and summing them. There is no data available on China’s gross 
expenditure on R&D in 1987. The next best available data reflects the expenditure on R&D from 
the 1987 government budget, which amounted to RMB 11.38 billion, which is 5.03 per cent of 
the government budget (National Bureau of Statistics, 1999). We argue that this figure by and 
large captures the R&D expenditure in China in 1987 because as of that year China had not yet 
started formally transforming its planned economy to a market-oriented economy (the 
transformation began after the then-leader Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992). Most R&D 
activities are still carried out by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, universities, public research 
institutions affiliated with ministries, and local governments. In the era of the planned economy, 
little R&D was done in state-owned enterprises and there were very few private firms (Huang et 
al., 2006). 
 
As seen in Table 9, the total value of invention patents originating in China accounted for only 
three per cent of the total value of invention patents in the 1987 cohort. The total value of 
invention patents applied for by foreign corporations amounted to a staggering RMB 83.6 billion, 
accounting for 91.1 per cent of the total value of invention patents. Foreign corporations were 
thus the major users and beneficiaries of the Chinese invention patent system in 1987.7 The total 
value of invention patents applied for by domestic entities reached RMB 2.7 billion (in constant 
2008 prices), which generated an equivalent subsidy rate of 6.7 per cent. Schankerman and Pakes 
(1986) estimated that the value of patent rights from age five in the UK, France, and Germany 
represented 5.7 per cent, 6.8 per cent, and 5.6 per cent, respectively, of business expenditure on 
R&D in these countries in 1970. Our estimation of the equivalent subsidy rate based on Chinese 
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invention patents is on the same order of magnitude as that of the estimation provided by 
Schankerman and Pakes of the total in three Western countries. 
 
The total value of invention patent rights is six times that of the total value of utility model patent 
rights. Contrary to what happens with invention patents, domestic individuals and organizations 
are the major users and beneficiaries of utility model patent systems. The value of utility model 
patent rights appropriated by domestic entities accounted for 94.4 per cent of the total value of 
utility model patents in the 1987 cohort. The value of domestic individuals’ utility model patents 
alone accounted for 46.8 per cent of the total value. The total value of utility model patents 
applied for by domestic entities amounted to RMB 13.9 billion, rendering an equivalent subsidy 
rate of 34.2 per cent. Invention and utility model patents in the 1987 cohort together provide 
equivalently 41 per cent of China’s R&D expenditure in 1987, which demonstrate that the patent 
system in China has offered a substantial incentive to inventive activity in the country.  
 
6. Renewal of invention patents applied for in the 2000s 
The methodology that we use to evaluate the value of Chinese invention patents requires that we 
observe  renewal information for patents over their full terms. This dictates that we cannot 
evaluate the value of Chinese invention patents applied for more recently than 20 years ago. 
Given the dramatic economic and social changes taking place in China over the last three 
decades, we would expect the intellectual property protection environment, incentives for patent 
application and renewal, and the behaviour of corporations, universities, and individuals 
regarding intellectual property rights to be very different in the late 1980s compared with the 
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situation today. It would thus be very useful and interesting to conjecture on the value of patents 
applied for in the relatively recent past based on available information and compare it with 
statistics for patents in the 1987–1989 cohorts.  
 
We choose the 2002 and 2003 cohorts for this exercise because SIPO extended the protection 
period for invention patents that were applied for before December 31st, 1992 and were valid 
until December 11th, 2001 to 20 years in anticipation of China’s 2001 entry into the WTO. It is 
likely that, following these changes, renewal decisions made by corporations, universities, and 
individuals regarding invention patents applied for after 2001 would differ from decisions 
regarding patents applied for before 2001. We do not choose to study even more recent cohorts 
because the examination period for invention patents lasts, on average, four years. Accordingly, 
there is much less renewal information available for more recent cohorts than is available for the 
2002 and 2003 cohorts. Even for the 2002 and 2003 cohorts, we have renewal information only 
until patents reach the ages of seven and six, respectively. 
 
As seen in Figure 4, dropout rates in the 2002 and 2003 cohorts are lower than are the 
corresponding rates in the 1987–1989 cohorts when patents are between five and seven years old. 
The lower dropout rate indicates that a higher proportion of patents are renewed for a longer 
period and, accordingly, the value of those patents is higher. If the dropout rates regarding the 
2002 and 2003 cohorts are consistently lower than are those of the 1987–1989 cohorts that are 
more than seven years old, the value of patents in the 2002 and 2003 cohorts would be higher 
those in the 1987–1989 cohort would be. 
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An important finding regarding the value of Chinese patents applied for in 1987–1989 is that 
patents applied for by foreign entities are higher in value than are patents applied for by domestic 
entities. The median value of invention patents applied for by foreign corporations, foreign 
individuals, foreign universities and research institutions, domestic individuals, domestic 
corporations, and domestic universities and research institutions is ranked in descending order. 
The order changes based on renewal information pertaining to the 2002 and 2003 cohorts.  
 
Figure 5 confirms that, irrespective of applicant type, patents lasting fewer than seven years in 
the 2002 and 2003 cohorts exhibited lower dropout rates than did such patents in the 1987–1989 
cohorts. Patents applied for by foreign universities and research institutions seem to have the 
highest value (or the lowest dropout rates), followed by patents applied for by foreign 
corporations. Differing from patents in the 1987–1989 cohorts, patents in the 2002 and 2003 
cohorts with the third highest value were applied for not by foreign individuals but by domestic 
corporations, with patents applied for by foreign individuals, domestic individuals, and domestic 
universities and research institutions following in descending order. This finding indicates that, 
in the 2000s, Chinese companies have invested more resources in maintaining their invention 
patents than they did in the late 1980s. Accordingly, the value of their patents applied for in the 
former period should be higher than is that of patents applied for in the latter period. Figure 6 
confirms that, as is the case with patent in the 1987–1989 cohorts, the value of patents in the 
2002 and 2003 cohorts originating in eastern provinces is higher than is that of patents 
originating in central and western provinces. 
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7. Conclusion  
In this paper, we estimate the value of Chinese invention patents that were applied for in 1987–
1989 and utility model patents that were applied for in 1986–1998. We evaluate and compare the 
value of patents in several cohorts, patents owned by several types of entities (including 
domestic and foreign individuals, universities and research institutions, and companies), patents 
falling into a range of technology fields, and patents originating in various provinces of China. 
The medians of invention patents applied for by foreign corporations, foreign individuals, 
foreign universities and research institutions, domestic individuals, domestic corporations, and 
domestic universities and research institutions are (at constant 2008 prices) RMB 1,072,829, 
RMB 616,443, RMB 354,164, RMB 86,392, RMB 59,157, and RMB 41,434, respectively. The 
medians of utility model patents applied for by foreign corporations, foreign universities and 
research institutions, foreign individuals, domestic corporations, domestic universities and 
research institutions, and domestic individuals are (at constant 2008 prices) RMB 541,284, RMB 
513,162, RMB 218,644, RMB 88,070, RMB 69,284, and RMB 38,564, respectively.  
 
We find that utility model patents that were applied for after their protection period was extended 
from eight years to ten years in 1993 following the first amendment of China’s Patent Law have 
higher value than those applied for before do. Patents applied for by foreign entities invariably 
have higher value than do those originating from domestic entities and the gap in value between 
these two groups of patents is significant. For example, the median value of invention patents 
applied for by foreign corporations is 18 times higher than is that of patents applied for by 
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domestic corporations. Patents originating in economically developed provinces in China’s 
eastern and coastal region are more valuable than are those from the economically 
underdeveloped provinces in the central and western regions.  
 
We also calculate the equivalent subsidy rate, which is defined as the ratio of the total value of 
patent rights to the R&D expenditure spent to produce those patents, a measure of the subsidy 
that would be paid to patent rights holders to produce the same level of R&D if patent protection 
was eliminated. We find that the value of invention patents and utility model patents in the 1987 
cohort applied for by domestic applicants represents, equivalently, 6.7 per cent and 34.2 per cent 
of China’s R&D expenditure in 1987. The equivalent subsidy from both types of patents together 
amount to about 41 per cent of China’s R&D investment for the same period, which indicates 
that the patent system in China has offered substantial incentives to those willing to undertake 
inventive activity in the country. Foreign corporations were the major users and beneficiaries of 
the Chinese invention patent system in 1987, appropriating about 91 per cent of the total value of 
invention patents in that cohort. On the other hand, domestic individuals and organizations are 
the major users and beneficiaries of the utility model patent system. They accounted for 94.4 per 
cent of the total value of utility model patents in the 1987 cohort.  
 
Although we are able to estimate the value of Chinese invention patents applied for from 1987 to 
1989, the intellectual property rights protection environment and the behaviour of companies, 
universities, and individuals regarding patent application and renewal in the late 1980s bear little 
similarity to what occurs today in modern China. To project the value of patents applied for 
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recently, we examine incomplete renewal information pertaining to invention patents in the 2002 
and 2003 cohorts. The analysis demonstrates that the value of patents in these two recent cohorts 
is likely higher than is that of patents in the 1987–1989 cohorts. Differing from those in the 
1987–1989 cohorts, patents in the 2002 and 2003 cohorts applied for by foreign entities did not 
have invariably higher value than do those of patents applied for by domestic entities. The value 
of patents applied for by domestic corporations was higher than was the value of patents applied 
for by foreign individuals, domestic individuals, and domestic universities and research 
institutions, but was lower than the value of patents applied for by foreign universities and 
research institutions, and foreign corporations. The gap in the value of patents applied for by 
domestic corporations and foreign corporations was significantly narrower in the 2000s. 
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Footnote: 
1. The nominal patent renewal fee ܥ௧௝ does not decrease as the age of the patent increases. 
However, the deflated patent renewal fee might decrease when the nominal renewal fee, being 
unchanged for a few years, is deflated. We will return to discuss this issue in Section 3. 
2. We are not able to estimate the value of design patents because the derivatives cannot be 
calculated by the nonlinear least square model based on available design patent data. 
3. We exclude utility model patents in the 1999 and 2000 cohorts because the renewal records 
for some patents from these two cohorts have not been fully updated in the database. 
4. The provinces in the eastern, central, and western regions are listed in Table 4. 
5. The value is US$154,473, US$88,759, US$50,995, US$12,439, US$8,518 and US$5,966, 
respectively. The US$ value is obtained by using the 2008 annual average exchange rate between 
the US dollar and the RMB: 1 US$=6.9451 RMB. 
6. The value is US$ 77,938, US$73,888, US$31,482, US$12,681, US$9,976, and US$5,553, 
respectively. 
7. Because foreign applicants applied for more invention patents than their domestic applicants 
did, and the value of invention patents held by foreign entities is higher, the total value of 
invention patents originating abroad has predominated after the Chinese patent system was 
established in the mid-1980s. However, since 2003 domestic entities have applied for more 
invention patents than foreign entities have. Accordingly, the share of the total value of invention 
patents taken by invention patents originating abroad should have declined gradually. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Invention Patents 
 Number Dropout rate (Per centage) Renewed to full term (Per centage) Age 5 Age 10 Age 15 
All 13,804 3 45 71 17 
Cohort      
Cohort 1987 4,632 2 47 72 16 
Cohort 1988 4,835 2 45 70 18 
Cohort 1989 4,337 5 45 71 17 
Applicant type      
Domestic individuals 1,356 5 66 91 3 
Domestic universities and 
research institutions 2,254 6 79 94 2 
Domestic corporations 1,028 6 71 90 4 
Foreign individuals 641 3 39 70 14 
Foreign universities and research 
institutions 236 4 50 72 14 
Foreign corporations 8,297 1 30 58 25 
Technology field      
Human necessities 1,312 3 45 71 17 
Performing operations; 
transportation 2,540 4 46 72 17 
Chemistry; metallurgy 4,210 2 44 70 17 
Textiles; paper 422 5 53 74 16 
Fixed construction 509 3 56 80 9 
Mechanical engineering; lighting; 
heating; weapons; blasting 1,247 4 48 73 14 
Physics 1,892 3 46 70 17 
Electricity 1,672 4 38 64 21 
Nationality and region      
East 2,844 5 72 92 3 
Central 1,018 6 76 93 2 
West 742 5 76 94 3 
Foreign 9,200 2 31 59 24 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics on Utility Model Patents 
 Number Dropout rate at age 5 (per centage) 
Renewed to full term 
(Per centage) 
All 349,703 61 6 
Cohort    
Cohort 1986 7,881 47 4 
Cohort 1987 12,712 53 4 
Cohort 1988 17,109 56 3 
Cohort 1989 17,842 70 3 
Cohort 1990 22,225 66 3 
Cohort 1991 27,520 69 2 
Cohort 1992 34,886 73 2 
Cohort 1993 35,702 68 6 
Cohort 1994 33,664 62 7 
Cohort 1995 32,973 57 8 
Cohort 1996 35,159 54 10 
Cohort 1997 33,387 52 10 
Cohort 1998 38,643 55 12 
Applicant type    
Domestic individuals 234,410 66 3 
Domestic universities and research 
institutions 29,663 58 7 
Domestic corporations 54,846 52 12 
Foreign individuals 22,941 41 14 
Foreign universities and research 
institutions 156 33 37 
Foreign corporations 7,609 25 37 
Technology field    
Human necessities 93,979 66 4 
Performing operations; transportation 83,829 61 7 
Chemistry; metallurgy 7,202 54 10 
Textiles; paper 6,011 58 9 
Fixed construction 30,952 60 6 
Mechanical engineering; lighting; 
heating; weapons; blasting 61,603 58 7 
Physics 35,062 59 7 
Electricity 31,065 57 9 
Nationality and region    
East 189,828 61 6 
Central 77,968 69 3 
West 51,095 64 4 
Foreign 30,706 37 19 
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Table 3: Estimates of Patent Renewal Models of Invention Patents (no-effects model and fixed-
effects model on cohort, applicant type, and technology field) 
Parameter 
No-effects 
model 
Fixed-effects 
model on 
cohort2 
Fixed-effects 
model on 
applicants2 
Fixed-effects 
model on 
technology field2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Μ 11.5(.73)*** 11.4(.74)*** 10.2(.38)*** 11.3(.71)*** 
Σ 2.7(.35)*** 2.6(.36)*** 2.6(.24)*** 2.7(.36)*** 
δ .28(.050)*** .28(.051)*** .29(.034)*** .29(.050)*** 
Cohort1988 - .16(.094)* - - 
Cohort1989 - .0059(.097) - - 
Domestic individuals - - .66(.11)*** - 
Domestic corporations - - .32(.094)*** - 
Foreign individuals - - 2.6(.25)*** - 
Foreign universities 
and research 
institutions 
- - 2.0(.21)*** - 
Foreign corporations - - 3.1(.30)*** - 
Human necessities - - - .76(.20)*** 
Performing operations; 
transportation - - - .18(.17) 
Chemistry; metallurgy - - - .57(.18)*** 
Fixed construction - - - .11(.17) 
Mechanical 
engineering; 
lighting; heating; 
weapons; blasting 
- - - .22(.17) 
Physics - - - .025(.17) 
Electricity - - - .38(.18)** 
     
R2 .63 .63 .83 .63 
Observation 1926 1926 1926 1926 
Note: 
1. Data in parentheses refer to standard deviations. *** denotes a significance level of 1%, ** 
denotes a significance level of 5%, * denotes a significance level of 10%. 
2. The reference group for regression (2) is cohort 1987. The reference group for regression (3) is 
domestic universities and research institutions. The reference group for regression (4) is the 
technology field “textiles; paper.” Accordingly, μ represents the initial returns on patents in these 
reference groups. 
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Table 4: Estimates of the Patent Renewal Model on Invention Patents (fixed-effects on location) 
Parameter Fixed-effects model on province2 Fixed-effects model on region2 
μ 12.5(.54)*** 12.3(.58)*** 
σ 2.1(.17)*** 2.1(.18)*** 
δ .25(.029)*** .24(.032)*** 
East region - -2.2(.24)*** 
Beijing -2.2(.24)*** - 
Tianjin -2.5(.26)*** - 
Hebei -2.6(.27)*** - 
Liaoning -2.6(.28)*** - 
Shanghai  -1.9(.23)*** - 
Jiangsu  -2.3(.25)*** - 
Zhejiang  -2.1(.24)*** - 
Fujian -2.2(.25)*** - 
Shandong -2.1(.24)*** - 
Guangdong -1.9(.23)*** - 
Hainan 1.2(.34)*** - 
Central region - -2.41(.26)*** 
Shanxi -2.5(.28)*** - 
Jilin -2.5(.27)*** - 
Heilongjiang  -2.5(.27)*** - 
Anhui  -2.1(.25)*** - 
Jiangxi -2.8(.30)*** - 
Henan -2.3(.25)*** - 
Hubei -2.2(.25)*** - 
Hunan -2.5(.27)*** - 
West region - -2.36(.26)*** 
Inner Mongolia -2.7(.31)*** - 
Guangxi -2.4(.27)*** - 
Sichuan -2.2(.25)*** - 
Guizhou -1.3(.21)*** - 
Yunnan -2.6(.28)*** - 
Shaanxi -2.6(.27)*** - 
Gansu -2.4(.27)*** - 
Qinghai -2.9(.31)*** - 
Ningxia -2.2(.47)*** - 
Xinjiang -3.5(.37)*** - 
Chongqing -2.1(.25)*** - 
   
R2 .86 .83 
Observation 1170 1170 
Note: 
1. Data in parentheses refer to standard deviations. *** denotes a significance level of 1%, ** 
denotes a significance level of 5%, * denotes a significance level of 10%. 
2. The reference group is patents originating in foreign countries. Accordingly, μ represents the 
initial returns on patents in this reference group.  
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Table 5: Distribution of the Value of Invention Patent Rights, by Applicant Type: 1987 Cohort 
(RMB, constant 2008 prices) 
Quantile Domestic individuals 
Domestic 
universities 
and research 
institutions 
Domestic 
corporations 
Foreign 
individuals 
Foreign 
universities 
and research 
institutions 
Foreign 
corporations 
.25 11,958 (28,944) 
4,575 
(933) 
7,160 
(2,274) 
99,496 
(12,234) 
56,208 
(15,193) 
179,653 
(214,761) 
       
.50 86,392 (84,919) 
41,434 
(24,007) 
59,157 
(12,215) 
616,443 
(407,841) 
354,164 
(347,912) 
1,072,829 
(727,550) 
       
.75 537,794 (504,499) 
264,503 
(252,857) 
365,979 
(327,287) 
3,606,545 
(4,430,076)
2,120,003 
(1,706,398) 
6,401,764 
(5,489,436) 
       
.90 2,646,904 (1,821,124) 
1,315,156 
(3,029,127) 
1,801,391 
(3,034,954) 
1.78E+07 
(3.07E+07) 
1.06E+07 
(3.40E+06) 
3.15E+07 
(7.51E+06)) 
       
Mean 2,712,743 (2,430,904) 
1,247,026 
(16,052,396) 
1,964,602 
(9,446,152) 
1.94E+07 
(1.61E+07) 
1.11E+07 
(1.90E+06) 
3.02E+07 
(1.94E+08) 
 
Note: Data in parentheses refer to standard deviations. 
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Table 6: Estimates of the Patent Renewal Model on Utility Model Patents (no-effects model and 
fixed-effects model on cohort, applicant type, and technology field) 
Parameter 
No-effects 
model 
Fixed-effects 
model on cohort2 
Fixed-effects 
model on 
applicants2 
Fixed-effects model 
on technology field2 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
μ 15.8(1.5)*** 8.7(.22)*** 11.8(.46)*** 15.6(1.5)*** 
σ 3.9(.56)*** 1.3(.075)*** 2.5(.18)*** 3.9(.56)*** 
δ .79(.054)*** .31(.025)*** .61(.034)*** .79(.054)*** 
Cohort1987 - .048(.073) - - 
Cohort1988 - -.18(.074)** - - 
Cohort1989 - -.044(.071) - - 
Cohort1990 - -.042(.071) - - 
Cohort1991 - -.024(.071) - - 
Cohort1992 - -.091(.072) - - 
Cohort1993 - .12(.071)* - - 
Cohort1994 - .37(.068)*** - - 
Cohort1995 - .49(.069)*** - - 
Cohort1996 - .70(.070)*** - - 
Cohort1997 - .80(.071)*** - - 
Cohort1998 - .80(.070)*** - - 
Domestic individuals - - -.57(.073)*** - 
Domestic corporations - - .25(.064)*** - 
Foreign individuals - - 1.2(.10)*** - 
Foreign universities and 
research institutions - - 2.0(.18)*** - 
Foreign corporations - - 2.0(.16)*** - 
Human necessities - - - -.21(.16) 
Performing operations; 
transportation - - - .47(.18)*** 
Chemistry; metallurgy - - - .27(.18) 
Fixed construction - - - .16(.17) 
Mechanical engineering; 
lighting; heating; 
weapons; blasting 
- - - .67(.19)*** 
Physics - - - .31(.17)* 
Electricity - - - .39(.18)** 
     
R2 .71 .75 .82 .71 
Observation 3472 3472 3472 3472 
Note: 
1. Data in parentheses refer to standard deviations. *** denotes a significance level of 1%, ** 
denotes a significance level of 5%, * denotes a significance level of 10%. 
2. The reference group for regression (2) is cohort 1986. The reference group for regression (3) is 
domestic university and research institutions. The reference group for regression (4) is the 
technology field “textiles; paper.” Accordingly, μ represents the initial returns on patents in these 
reference groups. 
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Table 7: Estimates of the Patent Renewal Model on Utility Model Patents (fixed-effects on 
location) 
Parameter Fixed-effects model on province2 Fixed-effects model on region2 
μ 13.7(.57)*** 13.6(.57)*** 
σ 2.3(.15)*** 2.2(.15)*** 
δ .64(.031)*** .63(.031)*** 
East region - -1.7(.16)*** 
Beijing -1.4(.17)*** - 
Tianjin -1.9(.19)*** - 
Hebei -2.1(.20)*** - 
Liaoning -2.0(.20)*** - 
Shanghai  -1.2(.17)*** - 
Jiangsu  -1.7(.19)*** - 
Zhejiang  -1.5(.18)*** - 
Fujian -1.8(.19)*** - 
Shandong -2.0(.20)*** - 
Guangdong -1.3(.17)*** - 
Hainan -2.0(.21)***  
Central region - -2.2(.18)*** 
Shanxi -2.0(.20)*** - 
Jilin -2.2(.21)*** - 
Heilongjiang  -2.1(.20)*** - 
Anhui  -2.0(.20)*** - 
Jiangxi -2.6(.23)*** - 
Henan -2.1(.20)*** - 
Hubei -2.0(.20)*** - 
Hunan -2.4(.22)*** - 
West region - -2.0(.18)*** 
Inner Mongolia -2.0(.20)*** - 
Guangxi -2.0(.20)*** - 
Sichuan -1.8(.19)*** - 
Guizhou -2.1(.20)*** - 
Yunnan -1.8(.19)*** - 
Shaanxi -2.0(.20)*** - 
Gansu -2.0(.20)*** - 
Qinghai -2.4(.22)*** - 
Ningxia -2.7(.24)*** - 
Xinjiang -2.0(.20)*** - 
Chongqing -1.6(.18)*** - 
   
R2 .88 .87 
Observation 2818 2818 
Note: 
1. Data in parentheses refer to standard deviations. *** denotes a significance level of 1%, ** 
denotes a significance level of 5%, * denotes a significance level of 10%. 
2. The reference group is patents originating in foreign countries. Accordingly, μ represents the 
initial returns on patents in this reference group. 
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Table 8: Distribution of the Value of Utility Model Patent Rights, by Applicant Type: 1987 
Cohort (RMB, 2008 constant price) 
Quantile Domestic individuals 
Domestic 
universities 
and research 
institutions 
Domestic 
corporations
Foreign 
individuals 
Foreign 
universities 
and 
research 
institutions 
Foreign 
corporations
.25 6,514 (5,427) 
11,968 
(6,276) 
15,443 
(5,607) 
40,364 
(31,245) 
92,945 
(5,788) 
100,174 
(7,330) 
       
.50 38,564 (6,586) 
69,284 
(5,002) 
88,070 
(22,567) 
218,644 
(174,452) 
513,162 
(430,275) 
541,284 
(539,469) 
       
.75 210,480 (261,447) 
373,811 
(324,636) 
477,601 
(519,287) 
1,148,460 
(1,947,520) 
2,729,341 
(973,011) 
2,909,231 
(1,132,180) 
       
.90 953,027 (609,919) 
1,694,523 
(2,377,135) 
2,115,377 
(1,743,489) 
5,245,121 
(16,049,010)
1.22E+07 
(6.18E+06) 
1.30E+07 
(7.47E+05) 
       
Mean 832,370 (9,939,448) 
1,391,938 
(12,846,177) 
1,834,789 
(8,203,055) 
4,830,111 
(4,302,938) 
1.04E+07 
(1.84E+07) 
1.14E+07 
(1.78E+07) 
 
Note: Data in parentheses refer to standard deviations. 
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Table 9: Total Value of Invention and Utility Model Patents in the 1987 Cohort  
 Number 
of 
patents 
Mean value (Million 
RMB, constant 
2008 prices) 
Total Value (Million 
RMB, constant 
2008 prices) 
Per 
centage 
in total 
Invention patents 
Domestic individuals 373 2.71 1,012 1.1% 
Domestic universities 
and research 
institutions 
811 1.25 1,011 1.1% 
Domestic 
corporations 
364 1.96 715 0.8% 
Foreign individuals 225 19.4 4,365 4.8% 
Foreign universities 
and research 
institutions 
94 11.1 1,043 1.1% 
Foreign corporations 2,768 30.2 83,593 91.1% 
Sum 4,632  91,740  
Utility model patents 
Domestic individuals 8,298 .832 6,907 46.8% 
Domestic universities 
and research 
institutions 
2,056 1.39 2,862 19.4% 
Domestic 
corporations 2,261 1.83 4,148 28.1% 
Foreign individuals 30 4.83 145 1.0% 
Foreign universities 
and research 
institutions 
0 10.4 0 0.0% 
Foreign corporations 60 11.4 684 4.6% 
Sum 12,712  14,746  
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Figure 1: Age paths of renewal proportion 
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Figure 2: Age paths of dropout proportion 
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Figure 3: Age paths of deflated renewal fee 
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Figure 4: Dropout rates of the 1987-1989, 2002, and 2003 cohorts 
Note: The dropout rate of the 2003 cohort at age seven is not available from the Database as the 
latest year covered in the Database is 2009. 
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Figure 5: Dropout rate of the 1987–1989, 2002, and 2003 cohorts by applicant type  
Note: The dropout rate in the 2003 cohort at age seven is not available from the Database as the 
latest year covered in the Database is 2009. 
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Figure 6: Dropout rate of the 1987–1989, 2002, and 2003 cohorts by region of origin 
Note: The dropout rate in the 2003 cohort at age seven is not available from the Database as the 
latest year covered in the Database is 2009. 
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